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Abstract
The Nigerian state today is nothing more than a rentier state whose neo-colonial
capitalist mode and social relations were not substantially modified by the rapid
transfonnation from the production of agricultural commodities (palm oil,
rubber, tin, cereals, etc.) to petroleum as the main source of capital
accumulation. The unpredictability and volatility of the rentier economy has
over the years been the central factor in all regime changes and democratic
developments since independence. While in the core developed countries the
. state historically evolved some measures of 'relative autonomy' from the
economically dominant class and fractions, the state in Nigeria fuses class
power and political power together. Thus the on-going struggle for state power
through the process ofdemocracy is simultaneously a struggle for the means of
distribution and consumption which only power can confer. This paper
therefore examines the structure of the Nigerian state and the attendant
constraint it poses for the practice and sustainability of democracy and
democratic institutions. The paper sums up the conclusion that the state in
Nigeria is anti-thetical to the survival ofdemocracy since the,state has become
politicised and instrumentalised into a partisan state that is at once the arena and
objectofparticularist conflicts. .
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It is obviously pragmatic to note that the historical oi-Di~~Kotth~N'igerian state from inception has
remained a foreign imposition both in its conception ~d organization, thus making it to operate
according to the principles ofstate capitalism. It derives iflogic from the colonial state where it
has remained an alienated entity serving the interests ofgroups and segments whose strength is a
function ofthe external conditions and classes and not the interest ofthe real material conditions
oftile Nigerian people.
The nation-state ofNigeria emerged out of political amalgamations ofextremely diverse ethnic
groups and class configurations brought together as a colonial necessity in 1914. Since then the
continued existence of the nation as a sovereign entity has proved to be a precarious balance
between the dominant elements ofthe social structure, namely- ethnicity, religion and class. The
configuration of social relationships among the people of Nigeria has been characterized by
instability arising from distorted production and reward systems, where the various social
groups feel marginalized and cheated in the appropriation of available resources, thus raising
stringent agitation for autonomy or a more equitable share of the nation's resources by the
various ethnic groups through several scheme such as the activities of militia (Agbesu Boys,
Odua Peoples' Congress (OPe), Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Bakassi Boys etc and other
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ethnic groupings in the various regions which have seriously shook and threaten the corporate
existence of the nation. This threats and general agitations do raise the fundamental national
question about its origin, the systems of production and distribution, types of leadership and
citizenship, democratic participation and defence of justice and human rights etc. It is these
issues that this paper seeks to address itselfwith in analyzing the structure ofthe Nigerian state
and the chaUenges it poses for the sustenance of the ideals of democracy and processes of
democratisation.
The natureofthe Nigerian state
Before the incursion ofBritish colonialism, there existed in the territorial entity known today as
Nigeriavarious ethnic groups who lived and interacted with themselves most essentially through
trade and in some cases through conquest by warfare. Beyond this contact, they existed as
autonomous socio-cultural, political and economic units but sharing some cultural patterns in
common. For example, the monarchical feudal system existed both in the Northern andSouthern
parts among the Hausa-Fulani emirates, the Yoruba, the Bini chiefdoms etc (Anikpo, 2002:51).
Despite these similarities, the pre-colonial ethnic groups maintained their respective autonomies
in governance and economic exploitation oftbeir resources. This was the setting until the British
colonialists imposed nationhood on them~ 1914.
During the colonial era, the British organizational style of 'divide and rule' with which they rule
the people did nothing to correct the divisive barriers that existed among the various ethnic
groups alongthe lines ofethnicity, religion and class. Rather, these elements ofthe social settings
were reinforced and used as instruments by the colonialists to gain competitive advantage in the
new political order toward meeting their economic interests/purposes of exploiting our
collective resources and dominating us in the process ofgovernance without any commitment to
building the ideals ofdemocracy and respect for human rights in the nation. These dividing lines
of ethnicity, religion and class categorization between the ethnic groups became intense and
hardened during the colonial and post colonial Nigeria, such that the class configurations were
interwoven with ethnic aJliances which enabled factions ofthe ruling class in the various regions
during the colonial and post-colonial period to strive to gain competitive political and economic
advantagesoverothercontenders in the quest to govern the nation.
It is this kind ofstructure that is most glaringly manifested in the'political arena, where we have
had eleven military regimes and three "democratically" elected governments that have
engendered instability and national crisis in the nation's political economy despite the enonnous
deposit ofnatural and mineral resources in the land. Thus the state from inception was seen as an
instrument and as an arena for intra-class struggle between the civilian, military, commercial,
and bureaucratic elements ofthe petty bourgeoisie and between these elements and the masses.
Yet in the light ofthe fragile relationship ofthis class to actual production, the state has become
an indispensable instrument of capital accumulation. As such the s~te thus constitutes the
principal instrument for private appropriation ofcapital where the different faction ofthe petty
bourgeoisie engaged in fierce struggle to control the instrumentality of state utilizing its
a1locativeand distributive power for their own private ends.. Furthermore, as various factions of,
the dominant class struggle to capture state power, they pay little attention to the economic and
social concern of the ordinary citizens. The neglect of their material needs and the instability
generated alienated them from politics. Politics thus became the exclusive domain of the
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dominant classes (Agbese, 1990:27).
Thus the incorporations of the nation-state ofNigeria into the process of international capitalist
accumulation as a primary products/ mineral producers ofsemi-industrial goods and the factional
class struggle among the leading nationalists, coupled with her dependence on the core
developed nations ofthe United states and Western Europe exposed the nation to the vulnerability
and vicissitudes ofinternational capitalism reflected in the country's state ofsocial and economic
crisis epitomized by incessant coup de tat and several political violence that permeated the polity.
i.e. the killings ofPaAlfred Rewanu, Bola Ige,Ayo Daramola, ChiefHarry Marshall etc are cases
in point.
Furthermore, the Nigerian state after independence still followed after the absolutism and
arbitrariness ofthe power ofthe colonial state such that it continued to be totalistic in nature and
its economic orientation highly statist. It presented itself often as an apparatus of violence, its
base in social forces remained extremely narrow and it relied for compliance unduly on coercion
rather than authority. With few exceptions, the elite who came to power decided to inherit and
exploit the system to their own benefit rather than transforming it democratically as had been
expected. This alienated them from the masses whom they now had to contain with force.
The elites came to see state power as the only way to secure life and property and some level of
freedom. This has accounted for the reason why state power since independence till date was
sought for with such desperation that politicaJ competition tended to degenerate into warfare as
gloriously manifested in Oyo state following the power tussle between governor Lodoja and
Adedibu over share ofsecurity votes; Dr. Chris Ngige (former governor ofAnambra state) and his
erstwhile godfather Chris Dba crisis that has brought mayhem upon the state as well as the
impeachment crisis that rocked Ekiti, Plateau,Anambra state respectively.
The state in post colonial Nigeria was privatized by the ruling elite who were and are still
operating in a state ofsiege. The leaders employed a great deal ofcoercion not only to constraint
the political expression ofmass discontent but also to imposed "political unity" in the midst of
considerable social pluralism. In addition, the character of the state and the political class has
never been conducive for the survival of the democratic enterprise. It is not surprising that for
most part ofour attaining independence over forty years, the only thing that has been developing
is underdevelopment in the political, economic and social sectors.
Democracy in Nigeria
Before we can discuss the place of democracy on Nigeria, it will be relevant to provide a
conceptual meaning of democracy which derives from two Greek words, "Demo" and "Kratia"
meaning people and the rule or popular power respectively. Accordingly, democracy is therefore
a governmental system that involves the widest spectrum of participation, either through
elections or through the administration of accepted/adopted (state) policies (Yaqub, 2000:26).
Also Edwards, Watterberg and Lineberry (1996) conceive ofdemocracy as means of selecting
policy makers and organizing government so that policy represent and respond to citizen's
preferences. Thus democracy can be seen- as the system of governance under which people
exercise their governing power directly or indirectly through their representative periodically
elected by themselves. Indeed, a democratic government is invariably a government that is
founded on the principle of the rule of law, accountability and transparency devoid of
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arbitrariness, highhandedness and dictatorship/autocracy.
From these definitions highlighted above, it is obvious that for any government and by
extension state with its apparatus to be called democratic, its origin must be based on the consent
ofthe people, and the people in this case refer to the people over which a government exercises
authority. Thus at the core of any system that attaches to itself the symbol of democracy are
found certain identifiable features to determine ifsuch a system is indeed democratic or not. As
such Dahl (1982: II) identified the following: right to vote (equality), right to run for elective
office (freedom), periodic free and fair elections conducted to choose elected officials, respect
for the rule oflaw(Justice), control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally
vested in elected officials, the rights of citizens to form and organized independent political
parties, interest groups and other associations(fratemity), accountability of government to the
governed etc. as the basic values that should be present for any system to be designated as
modern democracy.
However, a cursory evaluation of the practice ofdemocracy in Nigeria have shown repeatedly
over time that our political elites generally embrace democracy and enjoy democratic
legitimacy without subjecting themselves to the demands of democratic practice which they
have trivialized. The idea of using democracy as an essential platfonn for empowering the
people through providing them opportunity to access basic necessities and improving the
national development performance has not been realized. Rather, the democratization process
in Nigeria is characterized by cases ofeconomic mismanagement and brutal repression by the
indigenous leadership that has become life threatening for the ordinary people.
The demand for democracy in Nigeria and Africa in general derives from the pathology of
politicaI.decay occasioned by long years ofexploitative and oppressive state system which was
fIrst started by the British colonialist and continued after independence by our "national
leaders" (military/civilian) which basically depoliticized the society allowing the "leaders" to
dispense with the substance ofdemocratic participation. This dilemma was made more acute by
the endemic socio-economic problems that pervaded the Nigerian economy and its people. In
the word of a report of the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2000: I)
flashpoint of ethnic, communal, religious and resource conflict still persist and pervades the
nation. The economic environment is still very much unstable, the Niger Delta crisis is yet to be
resolved and today it has assume a worrisome dimension following the activities of hostage
takings ofexpatriate oilworkers in the oil rich Delta region.
Be that as it may, the path to democracy practice in Nigeria began during the colonial times
following several major constitutional conference starting with the 1922 Clifford constitution
down to independence in 1960. This was followed by the constitution of 1979 and 1999
constitution that ushered in the second and present republic we are presently operating. Also we
have operated two democratic systems of government namely parliamentary and presidential
systems since independence. However, our experiences at our experimenting with these
democratic practices have been largely anti-thetical to democratic norms, principles and even
politics. The past two experiments we have had including the present indulgence have been
characterized by political thuggery and brigandage, unmediated and unrestrained violence and
killings, lack of accountability and transparency, high level corruption and abuse of office,
rigging, exacerbating"1he misery to the people due to the lack of the fulfillment of their
existential and welfare expectations by the state.
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1t"., Ilnfor1ll1late dilemma plaguing the survival ofdemocracy and democratisation lay both in the
,I:: HIHk ulthe parties in power and the behaviourofthe opposition parties themselves. The ruling
partic~ Ifl Nigeria's democracy are always wont to foster a culture of harassment in a bid,
apparently to continue the politics of warfare of frustrating the opposition and bringing about
their extinction. On the other hand, the opposition themselves are never always tutored to accept
defeat in an election; instead they are prepared to destabilized the system or alternatively
fraterril!.c with the military to bring about an end to the life of the party in government as it has
been the norm in the Nigerian state.
Related to this is the manner in which elections are been conducted in this country and the role of
the electoral body saddled the task ofensuring that they are free, fair and reflective ofthe wishes
of the electorates. The electoral commissions we have had in the annals ofNigeria democracy
have never been quite free from criticisms for the conduct ofviable elections w~1ich is a crucial
component of democracy. The various electoral bodies we have had had always been accused
severally of being patently corrupt and partisan as well as collaborating with the incumbent
government in power to subvert the will of the people at all elections we have held with the
exception of the June 12 1993 presidential election which was adjudged the freest and fairest
election.
The political economy ofthe Nigerian State
To understand better the problems of democracy in Nigeria within the context of the state and
how it engenders political and economic instability in Nigeria, it is crucial to examine the
political economy ofthe state. Thus the characteristic and motive force ofthe Nigerian political
economic position within the context of the international economic system of capitalism and
international division of labour since the colonial times has remained that of a weak peripheral,
dependent state producing primary agricultural products which has been replaced by one
commodity oil for the world market. Foreign trade is still oriented toward exports of primary
products to the major metropolitan powers upon whom the economy continued to rely for the
importation oftechnology and capital intensive manufactures and know-how.
Thus, the Nigerian economy has come to conform to the classic profile of a mono-mineral
dependent enclave that has evolved into a rentier state in the world market where it severs the link
betw~en production and distribution. The country as a peripheral capitalist state is controlled by
the political elites who are non-capitalists which exist mainly to guarantee the conditions for the
reproduction and expansion of capitalist property relations and mode of production. Unlike the
elites in the core capitalist state, it lacked the socio-economic 'base' to sustain and develop a
relatively autochthonous capitalism and so intervenes in the economy, in collaboration with the
external elements of this economic base to create the preconditions for, and to promote private
accumulation.
Therefore the Nigeria state has thus become the platform for the creation of a bourgeoisie class
whose role is to promote the interests of the state class in the distribution, management of
investment, accumulation and hence capital formation. In a sense, therefore, the state has bewme
the "means of production" in peripheral society in so far as it monopolizes the means of
exploitation, appropriates a large part ofthe surplus value, and acts as the fundamental source of
accumulation and hence of class formation. Thus the on-going struggle for state power by the
elites is nothing but a struggle for the means ofdistribution and consumption which only the state
power can confer (Graf, 1988:224-225).
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Since the state cannot in some measure stand above the society, it becomes a broker among
structurally heterogeneous parts or segments of the plural society. This now breed competition
among and between individual (all more or less state dependent) capitals which becomes a
complex series of fractional struggle within and for the state. For example the current
entanglement between President Obasanjo and his vice-president Atiku aptly describe this
competing struggle which now takes place within the framework of the nation-state, where the
relative strength of the contenders are defmed by their sectoral, ethnic or fractional
constituencies.
Given the moment the state power is captured by the coalition of particularized segments, it
becomes 'their' provisional property that is privatized and used to create opportunities for
accumulation, new positions; new area ofinvestment and by the same margin broadens the range
of its beneficiaries in order to create firmer links of patronage and clienteles. This activity is an
obvious manifestation of most governments in Nigeria with particular reference to the
Babangida, Abacha and the present Obasanjo'Administration for generating patronages and
clienteles, an act that clearly negates the central function of the state as system maintenance for
improving the welfare ofthe greatest majority rather than a circle ofcabals.
Thus the primary role of the Nigerian state is to establish, maintain, protect and expand the
conditions of capitalist accumulation in general, without which neither foreign nor Nigerian
capital can prosper. This it has done creditably with the economic reforms policy of
Privatization, Deregulation and Liberalization in the key sectors of the Nigerian economy i.e.
Oil, communication, sales ofgovernment estates/enterprises etc. The peripheral state specializes
in the political regulation and ordering of the conditions of production which are initiated and
sustained by external forces. Market relations as it were, are controlled by the core through the
aggregating institutions of international capital such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, while social relations is carried out by the peripheral state.
Local state power thus attends to labour discipline, political stability and the politics of
distribution within the state. Its task primarily is to ensure the totality of the conditions of
capitalist relations of production for which it receives a negotiated share ofthe surplus, which it
facilitates. The more it furthers exploitation within, therefore, the "stronger" it becomes. This
disjuncture between politics as means ofcontrol at the state level and economics as the means of
development at the international level has made the state in many ways a "territorial
incongruence" between the inter-linked processes of "national" politics and the international
economy (Hanisch and Tetzlaff,n.d).
Thus character ofthe post-colonial state in Nigeria is that its power over the economy and society
is enormous, arbitrary and it is largely privatized very much like its colonial predecessor. For all
but few of its citizens, it is alien and remote, uncaring and oppressive. As was the case with the
colonial state, the distinguishing feature of the post-colonial state in Nigeria is its lack of
autonomy; power is highly fused and used by those in control ofthe state simply as an instrument
for serving their own interests. Lack ofautonomy has been further compounded by the enormous
power of the state and the lack of institutional checks on this power, all of which has raised
enormously the premium on political power breeding the type ofpolitics that is characterized by
intense and lawless political competition where violence and instability are endemic. The state
·class emerges as a network ofclients and patrons linked to the state as a principal supplier ofthe
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means of consumption, and economic power is detennined by proximity to the state hierarchy
itself.
Obstacles to Democracy in Nigeria
The fundamental hindrance to the survival ofdemocracy in Nigeria lie in the obvious division of
the mling class elite along ethnic, religious, regional and class lines. Such factionalism, coupled
with the historical mistrust and hostility during colonial and post colonial period deals a deadly
blow to our democracy experimentation. For example, the Nigerian political reform conference
in 2005, the recently released 2006 population census results, the question ofrevenue allocation
formula and resource derivation and transfer of power etc are just some of the pertinent issues
tearing apart the growth and sustenance ofdemocracy inNigeria.
In the same vein, there is pervasive insecurity about the state given the insatiable appetite for
power by our elites that they tend to narrow the social base ofpower in tenns ofthose who are
obliged to share in its exercise. Those in power are inclined to share it only with a very small
coterie ofcollaborators. Often the state is effectively privatized in the control ofthis small group,
whose powerful members are usually drawn from the leader's community, religious faith,
geographical region or ethnic base. Thili was the case during the Babangida regime which
employed the phenomenon ofexclusion and the monopoly ofpower (Ake, 2003:39).
These exclusionary tendencies extended the struggles among elites to engulfthe society. When
this strategy is used, it also elicits by way of response a struggle for incorporation which also
reaches beyond the elite to the rest of society leading to clash of identities, especially ethnic
identities. This tendency has always reared its ugly head in Nigeria's polity following the
demand by the various ethnic groups that it is their turn to produce the next president for the
country thus dividing the nation along ethnic lines which is not healthy for the country's
democracy. As such, when political struggles are constituted around such ideas and social
formations, they tend to be very intense and violent leading to ethnic conflicts.
Related to the political impediments toward the survival of democracy in Nigeria is the
economic angle, wherein the practice ofdemocracy since 1999 has been characterized by severe
economic and social problems. The adoption of the on-going economic refonn policy by the
Obasanjo administration has further widen and heighten the incidence ofpoverty and economic
underdevelopment of the majority of the people due to loss ofjobs, increases in the price of
petroleum products, infrastmctural decay etc, with the likely effect of furthering aggravating
decades ofviolence, mistmst and fear, and lack ofenthusiasm by the governed in the democratic
process as epitomized by the inevitability of suffering, injustice and inequality which is
increasing been exacerbated during the pres~nt democratic transitions in Nigeria. The same was
the situation during the Babangida transition which lasted for eight years (1986-92) which
eventually resulted in an annuhnent and the crisis that followed which ahnost put the country on
the edge ofviolent disintegration.
Paradoxically, economic development does not inevitably produce liberal democracy, nor is
democracy necessarily compatible with development, since economic development promotes
social inequality and is anti-democratic. Our elites in power at the various levels ofgovernment
are so undisciplined and incoherent to initiate and carry out a development project as their fast
developing Asian economies, notably Hong Kong, South-Korea, Singapore, Thailand and
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Taiwan (The World Bank 1993). The basic paradox of democracy and democratic processes is
!bat those who have power tendentially have no interest or inclination to democratise, for
democratisation entails the redistribution of power against those in power and those who are
privileged. For example, the failed third tenn attempt ofObasanjo ad~inistrationto extend his
tenure beyond the two tenns of eight years approved by the constitution and the refusal of the
various governments (civilian! military) to hold a sovereign national conference to discuss the
future ofNigeria is a case in point.
Furthennore, it is sad to emphasize that the idea ofdemocracy and the process ofdemocratisation
in Nigeria since independence has been reduce to mere electoral competition, which conceal the
illusion ofvoting without choosing. To all appearances democratisation is not doing much about
the democratic transformation of the state in order to create a window ofopportunity, a political
framework where groups struggling for development and human rights have better possibilities
for expressing, organizing and realizing their demands; rather attention is only on who control
the state. When democratic processes is limited to the competitive selection by political society
at large ofthose who control the state, what we have mainly gained in the end ofany transition is
nothing but the right to choose between oppressors, not the right to choose between liberty and
oppression.
Another very pungent challenge to the survival of democracy in Nigeria is the very faulty
structural defection upon which the foundation ofthe nation was based. The British through its
policy of indirect rule set the stage for the state structure where the main administrative and
political units were made to coincide with,the spatial locations of the major nationalities of
Nigeria, the Yoruba, Ibo and the Hausa-Fulani. This regionalization framework set the stage for
the emergence of the regionalization of the nationalist leadership who opted for power in the
region instead ofremaining in the central government which was still under British rule. This was
the context that underscores the rising tide of ethnonationalism which has marked Nigeria's
march to independence and beyond. Till date, this framework has created a state structure which
lacked autonomy and inability to rise above the conflicts and struggles among particularistic,
interests between the North and South. It was this structure that led to the collapse ofthe first and
second republic, the thirty month civil war and the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential
elections and is presently threatening the survival of the fourth republic administration in
Nigeria. This lack of a state building project that will crystallize the collective purpose of the
various major ethnic collectivities and the fear ofdomination by the minorities has been the bane
ofpolitical integration and democratic political stability in Nigeria and further worsened during
the eraofmil itary rule.
Conclusion
From the foregoing discourse, it is clearly fundamental that the institutionalization ofdemocratic
governance does not occur simply by holding elections, changing leaders, constitUtions, and/or
public orientation to the process of governance. Nigerians must seize the opportunity that this
present democratic experimentation provides to chart a new vision for the collective
development of the nation through the institutionalization of a legitimate political order, and
refusing to be used by the ruling classes to perpetrate electoral fraud and chaos in order to
truncate the process.
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Thus the survival of democracy in Nigeria can only thrive if the whole process of its
conceptualization and institutionalization is people based, where popular participation is not a
mere rhetoric, but a process by which the people themselves press for genuine democracy
accented to by them and to establish independent peoples' organizations that are genuinely grass-
, roots, democratically administered and selfreliant.Also, for democracy to succeed in this nation,
the living conditions and well-being of the majority of the people must be guaranteed and
provided for in order to empower them to make them participate actively as stakeholders in the
genuine effort to chart a positive political and economic direction for the corporate existence of
the,nation.
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